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29 November 1960

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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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### Approved For Release 2002/09/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400250001-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 November 1960

#### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran: Iranian Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is discouraged at the Shah's continued interference in government operations and fears that the Shah is planning to rig the new parliamentary elections as blatantly as those of last August, which the Shah canceled following widespread protests. Former Prime Minister Eqbal is working hard, according to Sharif-Emami, to persuade the Shah that the last elections were actually satisfactory and that the same procedures should be followed again. The prime minister also expects the Shah to schedule elections before the new American administration takes office in the belief that this would avoid American pressure for freer elections.

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The Shah appears unwilling to give up his day-to-day concern with governmental affairs--although he has insisted several times that he would do so--and Sharif-Emami is facing the same situation which reduced the former Prime Minister virtually to the status of a "yes man" for the Shah.

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
Indonesia: President Sukarno is pursuing plans to bring Communists into the cabinet despite opposition from army officials. Communist appointments to the national government have so far been limited to rubber-stamp legislative bodies and advisory groups which have not effectively

challenged the army's political power.

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Approved For Release 2002/09/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A005400250001-4 Laos: A government good-will mission, possibly led 25 🗱 by Premier Souvanna Phouma himself, is scheduled to visit OK Hanoi and Peiping in early December. The dispatch of such a mission was one of the major points of agreement between Souvanna and the Pathet Lao in their mid-November accords. A National Assembly delegation, headed by assembly president Tiao Somsanith, apparently will fly to Savannakhet 25X1 on 30 November in an effort to find some basis of negotiation with General Phoumi. The Somsanith delegation will probably be unable to bridge the chasm between Phoumi and Souvanna; 29 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved For Release 2002/09/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005400250001-425X1



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forces in an effort to control four consecutive days of rioting in Caracas. The disturbances, which may be a decisive phase in the contest for power, are almost certainly being promoted by pro-Castro leftists as part of a campaign of violence initiated in October to undermine Betancourt. The long-widening rift in Cuban-Venezuelan relations seems to be nearing an open break. Betancourt is believed still to have the backing of most of the armed forces; moderate political elements and much of organized labor are likely to rally to his support.

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DAILY BRIEF

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### Iranian Premier Dissatisfied With Shah's Continuing Interference

aged over the Shah's failure to consult with him on policies and key appointments and by the monarch's continued involvement in day-to-day government operations. Sharif-Emami has claimed several times recently that the military in particular are bypassing him and going to the Shah for support. The prime minister also fears that the Shah has not learned from the elections last August-which the Shah canceled after widespread protest over blatant rigging-and will again use government pressure to ensure the election of his chosen deputies. Sharif-Emami expected the Shah to schedule elections before the new American administration takes office in the belief that this would avoid American pressure for freer elections.

_According to Sharif-Emami, former Premier Eqbal is attempting to persuade the Shah that the August elections were actually satisfactory and that similar procedures		
should be followed in new elections.		
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repetition of rigging would be likely to precipitate the most serious crisis in Iran since the Mossadeq period.

The Shah, despite his assurances on several occasions that he would withdraw from day-to-day personal control of governmental affairs, is unwilling to do so. Sharif-Emami now finds himself in the same situation which has reduced previous prime ministers to impotence. He must accept the role of a virtual "yes man" to the Shah, as Eqbal chose to do,

or resign.

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#### Indonesian President Plans to Include Communists in Cabinet

President Sukarno is pursuing plans to bring Communists into the cabinet despite opposition from the army. Communist appointments to the government so far have been limited to rubber-stamp legislative bodies and advisory groups which have not effectively challenged the army's political power. Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy" calls ultimately for an amalgam of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements from which government leaders will be selected and from which all party lines eventually will disappear.

Sukarno apparently will press his efforts to overcome army objections on the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet. Should the army remain adamant, however, he is likely to shelve his plan until a more favorable opportunity arises.

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#### Salvadoran Communists to Organize Peasant Committees

The Communist-dominated labor federation of El Salvador (CGTS) has announced it is proceeding with plans to organize peasant committees throughout the country. Should the junta, contrary to the practice of previous governments, permit the organization of the peasants, this would provide the Communists with a potent political weapon. Salvadoran peasants, a generally depressed group with real socioeconomic grievances, can easily be manipulated politically. The organization of peasant committees could also be the first step by the Communists toward organizing a peasant militia with which to defy any attempt by the armed forces to dislodge the Communists from the provisional government, where they and their supporters have become entrenched at all levels.

The CGTS, which has operated virtually without government restrictions since the ouster of the Lemus regime last month, reportedly invited peasants to a meeting on 6 November, where they heard a Salvadoran Communist recently returned from Peiping and Cuba speak on methods used in disarming an army and in organizing a civilian militia. On 20 November peasants were brought from outlying towns to San Salvador where they participated in a mass meeting sponsored by the CGTS and pro-Communist and pro-Castro students. Dr. Roberto Carias Delgado, secretary general of the Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party, told the crowd, estimated at 7,000 to 10,000, that "a foreign country"—meaning the United States—"was using ships and planes" as a means of interfering with their fight to rid themselves of "dictators and oppressors."

The Communist tactic of organizing the peasants, more than any other development, would probably strengthen the resolve of anti-Communists, particularly among the military.

The army and the wealthy landowners have long feared that the large peasant population might revolt, as in 1932, when a Communist-led insurrection was suppressed by the army only after thousands had been killed.

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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